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Global financial markets(1)
Overview
Most prices of risky assets rose further, continuing the recovery
that began in March.  This appeared to reflect increased
confidence by market participants that, while economic
activity had contracted by more than previously anticipated,
the prospects for future economic growth had improved and
the downside risks to financial markets had diminished.
The actions of governments and central banks remained an
important factor underpinning this recovery in financial
markets, through policies aimed at boosting nominal demand,
injecting liquidity to strengthen financial system stability and
through measures to support improved market functioning.  
At its August meeting, the UK Monetary Policy Committee
(MPC) extended the size of its asset purchase programme to
£175 billion.  In addition, the Bank widened the scope of its
Asset Purchase Facility to include secured commercial paper.
Elsewhere, the European Central Bank (ECB) implemented its
plan to purchase covered bonds and offered unlimited 
one-year refinancing operations.  And the US Federal Reserve
and the Bank of Japan continued with their respective
programmes of asset purchases and other refinancing 
facilities.
These operations contributed to sustained increases in the size
of central bank balance sheets (Chart 1), and accompanied a
significant expansion in government balance sheets of many
major economies, reflecting fiscal support measures.
Uncertainty about the future path of risky asset prices
generally fell further over the quarter.  However, implied
volatilities on short-term interest rates rose (Chart 2), which
could reflect increased uncertainty about the timing and 
pace at which accommodative monetary policy measures
might be withdrawn.
Recent developments in international capital markets
Monetary policy implementation
Monetary policies in most major economies remained
stimulative.  Given their forecasts for, and continued
uncertainties about, the macroeconomic outlook, many
central banks maintained official interest rates at low levels
(Chart 3).
This article reviews developments in global financial markets since the 2009 Q2 Quarterly Bulletin
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Sources:  Bank of England and Bloomberg.
(a) Excludes loans and associated deposits in course of settlement. 
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(a) Average for sterling Libor, Euribor and US dollar Libor.
(b) WTI crude oil.
(c) Average for euro-US dollar, euro-sterling and sterling-US dollar exchange rates.
(d) Average for FTSE 100, DJ Euro Stoxx 50 and S&P 500 indices.
Chart 2 International twelve-month option-implied
volatilities
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In addition, central banks continued to undertake
unconventional monetary policy measures.  The wide range of
policies adopted since the failure of Lehman Brothers in 2008
reflected differences in the objectives of each policy measure.
These included supporting market functioning, injecting
liquidity to strengthen financial system stability and increasing
the supply of money to boost nominal demand.
In the United Kingdom the MPC voted at its meeting on 
6 August that it would further extend its programme of asset
purchases from £125 billion to a total of £175 billion, to be
completed by the time of its November meeting.  More details
of these asset purchases are provided on pages 168–71.
The ECB, following their pre-announcement on 7 May, began
its purchase programme of covered bonds, the aims of which
were to ease funding conditions, encourage lending and
improve market liquidity.  And on 24 June the ECB offered its
first unlimited twelve-month refinancing operation, in which it
lent €442 billion.  In the United States and Japan, the
respective central banks continued their programmes of asset
purchases.  
Short-term interest rates
The implementation of unconventional monetary policy
initiatives, particularly those injecting extra central bank
reserves, tended to push down overnight market interest rates.
These rates typically traded below policy rates in the 
United Kingdom and the euro area and within the US Federal
Reserve’s target range of 0–25 basis points (Chart 4). 
In the United States, asset purchases injected reserves in
excess of required reserve balances and contractual clearing
balances.  Over the period, the Federal Reserve banks paid
interest of 0.25% on depository institutions’ balances.
However, not all money market participants were eligible to be
paid interest by the US Federal Reserve and overnight interest
rates tended to trade below 0.25%.
In the euro area, the ECB’s twelve-month refinancing operation
injected considerable excess reserves.  This resulted in
overnight market interest rates tending to trade between the
ECB’s policy rate and the rate paid on the marginal deposit
facility where the excess reserves were placed.
In the United Kingdom, where since 5 March all reserves
balances held by commercial banks at the Bank were
remunerated at Bank Rate, sterling overnight interest rates
generally traded close to Bank Rate.  But have mostly been
lower since mid-June.
For most of the period, sterling unsecured overnight interest
rates continued to be lower than corresponding secured
overnight interest rates (Chart 5).  Banks might usually be
expected to charge a premium for the credit risk associated
with unsecured interbank lending compared to a secured
transaction of equivalent maturity.  However, as noted in
previous Bulletins, money markets are to some extent
fragmented.  For example, some institutions are generally only
able to participate in the secured repo markets, while other
institutions may predominantly be active in unsecured
markets.  This may mean that there are in practice a number of
market participants unable to utilise the unsecured market to
finance secured lending and so earn a ‘risk-less’ spread.  
Near-term expectations of future overnight rates, as indicated


















(b) ECB main refinancing rate.
(c) Federal funds rate.  From December 2008 the series is the upper bound of the Federal
Reserve’s current 0%–0.25% target range.
(d) Bank of Japan uncollateralised overnight call rate.





















Sources:  BrokerTec, Wholesale Market Brokers’ Association and Bank calculations.
(a) Spread of weighted average secured overnight rate to Bank Rate.
(b) Spread of weighted average unsecured overnight rate to Bank Rate.
(c) Spread of weighted average unsecured overnight rate (Fed funds effective rate) to the rate at
which the Federal Reserve remunerates reserves holdings (also the upper bound of the
Federal Reserve’s 0% to 0.25% target range).
(d) Spread of weighted average unsecured overnight rate (EONIA) to policy rate.
Chart 4 Spread of overnight interest rates to policy 
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that central banks would maintain official interest rates at low
levels at least into 2010 Q1.  However, expectations for the
latter part of 2010 and for 2011 rose, and so OIS curves
steepened internationally (Chart 6).  At least in part this was
likely to reflect expectations for quicker increases in future
policy rates once central banks in the major economies start to
withdraw their monetary stimulus.  Similarly, against the
background of surveys suggesting upward revisions to GDP
growth forecasts for 2010 (Chart 7), Reuters’ surveys indicated
that the future paths for expected policy rates steepened,
although by less than implied by the profile of market interest
rates.
One possible explanation for the larger increase in market
interest rates may have been increased uncertainty about
future official rates and hence greater term premia, possibly
linked to uncertainty about the timing and execution of policy
tightening.  Perhaps consistent with that, short-term interest
rate option-implied volatility generally rose at horizons of six
and twelve months (Chart 8).
These short-term interest rate options reference London
interbank offered rates (Libor), however.  This means the
pickup in implied volatility could be due to uncertainty about
the Libor-OIS spread (ie the additional risk premia embedded
in Libors) rather than uncertainty about expected future policy
rates.  One way to gauge uncertainty about future policy rates
is to employ a model-based decomposition of the yield curve
at short horizons.(1) Such a decomposition would seem to
indicate that term premia on sterling short-term OIS rates
may indeed have risen over recent months (Chart 9).
Another factor influencing the steepness of the OIS curve may
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Source:  Consensus Economics.
(a) Simple average of GDP forecasts for Asia Pacific excluding Japan, Eastern Europe and 
Latin America.  















Sources:  Bloomberg and Bank calculations.
Chart 8 Changes in short-term interest rate implied
volatility since previous Bulletin
(1) For information on empirical term structure models, see ‘Recent advances in
extracting policy-relevant information from market interest rates’, 2008 Q2














Solid lines:  28 August 2009
Dashed lines:  22 May 2009
Sources:  Bloomberg and Bank calculations.

















Sources:  BrokerTec and Bank calculations.
Chart 5 Spread between secured and unsecured sterling
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policy rates given that in practice nominal rates are likely to be
constrained to be at least zero.  Indeed, an estimated modal
expectation for sterling OIS rates (Chart 10), which reflects
the most likely outcome, was some distance below the mean
expectation (see box on pages 158–59 for more details on
deriving probability distributions for OIS rates).  Moreover, the
degree of skewness of the indicative implied distribution for 
twelve-month OIS rates increased somewhat over the quarter.
Bank funding markets
Conditions in domestic interbank funding markets reportedly
continued to improve over recent months.  Libor fixings (the
most widely used benchmark for interbank rates) fell further
and the spread between term Libors and equivalent-maturity
OIS rates narrowed to their lowest levels since March 2008,
prior to the collapse of Bear Stearns (Chart 11).
Forward spreads implied by derivatives settling on Libor
(forward rate agreements) suggested that three-month 
Libor-OIS spreads were expected to stay close to their 
end-August levels.  However, forward spreads inferred from
spot Libor rates of different maturities continued to suggest
otherwise, implying that term premia on longer-term Libor
fixings remained elevated (Chart 11).  This indicates that banks
wishing to borrow for longer maturities were not necessarily
benefiting in full from the reductions in expected three-month
Libor fixings.
Moreover, contacts suggested that interbank lending volumes
remained low, even relative to levels seen prior to the failure of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008.  And though money
market funds increased the maturities at which they were
prepared to lend (Chart 12), contacts said that lending at
maturities greater than three months remained patchy.
Contacts suggested that one possible driver of the reductions



















Source:  Bank calculations. 
(a) For more details on how term premia can be estimated, see Joyce, Lildholdt and Sorensen
(2009), ‘Extracting inflation expectations and inflation risk premia from the term structure:  a
joint model of UK nominal and real yield curves’, Bank of England Working Paper no.360.
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(a) Solid lines refer to data as at 28 August.  Dashed lines refer to 22 May.
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Sources:  Bloomberg, British Bankers’ Association and Bank calculations.
(a) Forward spreads derived using data as at 28 August.
(b) The squares are implied forward spreads using forward Libors derived from spot Libor rates.
The diamonds are implied forward spreads using forward Libors derived from forward rate
agreements.
Chart 11 Three-month Libor-OIS spreads(a)(b)158 Quarterly Bulletin  2009 Q3
An indicative decomposition of the 
option-implied probability distribution for
Libor
Forward overnight index swap (OIS) rates are typically thought
to provide the best estimates of the mean expectation for
Bank Rate.  In fact, OIS forward rates represent the mean of
the risk-neutral probability distribution of possible outcomes
for future unsecured overnight interest rates, which typically
trade close to Bank Rate.  This distribution will differ from that
actually held by market participants to the extent that
investors demand compensation for uncertainty surrounding
future outturns for overnight rates.  That is, OIS rates may
include term premia.  
Moreover, if the perceived distribution of possible outcomes is
skewed such market-based estimates of mean expectations
will not coincide with expectations of the most likely outcome,
ie modal expectations.  In particular, if nominal rates were in
practice constrained to be at least zero per cent, then the
distribution of future possible overnight rates is likely to be
positively skewed, with the mode some distance below the
mean.(1)
While maintaining a risk-neutral set-up, this box sets out a way
of using financial prices to provide an indicative market-based
measure of the probability distribution around future overnight
rates and hence Bank Rate.
Option prices can often be used to infer market participants’
views about the distribution of possible outcomes for future
asset prices.  But unfortunately options on OIS rates are not
available.  Instead, short-term interest rate options refer to the
London interbank offered rate (Libor).  And that means that
the implied probability distributions that the Bank regularly
produces will reflect both market expectations of future 
Bank Rate and the premium which compensates investors for
the credit and liquidity risk associated with interbank lending.
Nevertheless, options on Libor can still be informative.  Libor
can be thought of as comprised of two parts:  the OIS rate and
the Libor-OIS spread.  That is, Libor = OIS + (Libor-OIS).  In a
similar way, a probability distribution for Libor can be seen as
combining the distributions for these two components.  
The following process can be used to produce a simple,
indicative decomposition of the option-implied probability
distribution for Libor, into distributions for OIS rates and the
risk premia in Libor (ie the Libor-OIS spread).
Step 1 — choose candidate underlying distributions for the OIS
rate and the Libor-OIS spread.  This requires an assumption
about their functional forms.  In practice, these distributions
should be bounded below by zero.  For simplicity they are both
assumed to be independently log-normally distributed, with
means equal to the forward OIS rate and the forward 
Libor-OIS spread.  
Step 2 — aggregate together the OIS rate and Libor-OIS
spread distributions assumed in step one to give the
distribution of the sum: 
OIS + (Libor-OIS).
This uses a mathematical operation called a convolution.  
Step 3 — compare the aggregate distribution from step two to
the option-implied Libor distribution.(2)
Step 4 — iteratively search through different combinations of
the distributions for OIS rates and Libor-OIS spreads, to find
the combination that best replicates the option-implied Libor
distribution.(3) That combination comprises the indicative
distributions for OIS rates and Libor-OIS spreads.
Chart A shows the decomposition for three-month Libor in
December 2009 on 28 August.  The dark blue line represents
the indicative OIS rate distribution.  The positive skew means
that the modal OIS expectation was approximately 5 basis
points below the mean expectation.  The magenta line shows
the indicative distribution for the Libor-OIS spread.  





Source:  Bank calculations.
(a) Based on options on the December 2009 Libor futures contract.
(b) Aggregate of indicative distributions for OIS rates and Libor-OIS spreads. 
Chart A Option-implied probability distributions for
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The light blue line is the synthetic Libor distribution formed by
aggregating the dark blue and magenta lines.  This seems to
broadly mimic the usual option-implied Libor distribution,
shown by the yellow line in the chart.(4) But the fit is clearly
not perfect and as a result any inferences about the estimated
probability distribution can only be indicative.
Although only indicative, this decomposition can potentially
provide a useful framework for apportioning the amount of
uncertainty around future interbank interest rates into that
driven by the uncertainty around Bank Rate and that driven by
the uncertainty around the Libor-OIS spread.  It also provides a
consistent framework for measuring the difference between
mean and modal market expectations of Bank Rate (a measure
of the skewness of the implied distribution for future OIS
rates), and how that difference has evolved over time.  
Chart B compares the change between 22 May and 28 August
in the estimated three-month and twelve-month distributions
for sterling OIS rates and Libor-OIS spreads.  It suggests that
while the falls in sterling three-month Libor over this period
were driven by falls in both OIS rates and Libor-OIS spreads,
the shapes of the estimated probability distributions for 
three-month OIS rates and Libor-OIS spreads were both
broadly unchanged.  In contrast, the pickup in twelve-month
forward Libors and OIS rates was accompanied by a widening
and an increase in skew of the estimated distribution for OIS
rates, while the distribution of the Libor-OIS spread was little
changed.  This perhaps suggests investors became more
uncertain about future Bank Rate at that horizon than about
the additional risk compensation embedded in Libors.
(1) This issue was discussed in the box ‘Assessing expectations of Bank Rate’ in the 
August 2009 Inflation Report, page 41.
(2) Distributional similarity is measured here using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic.
(3) Because each log-normal distribution is defined with two parameters, and there are
two restrictions, this iterative search represents a constrained optimisation over the
two remaining degrees of freedom.
(4) As is true here, the convolution of two density functions can look quite different from
each individual density function.  For example, if one knew that both the OIS rate and
Libor-OIS spread in three months’ time would lie between 0.25% and 0.75%, this
would imply a Libor rate between 0.5% and 1.5% — that is, the Libor distribution
would be twice as wide as the individual OIS and Libor-OIS spread distributions, and

























Source:  Bank calculations.
Chart B Changes in the implied distributions for OIS
rates and Libor-OIS spreads since previous Bulletin160 Quarterly Bulletin  2009 Q3
creditworthiness of financial institutions, as evidenced by falls
in international banks’ credit default swap (CDS) premia 
(Chart 13), and hence lower required risk compensation for
interbank lending.
But falls in CDS premia do not seem to explain fully the falls in
Libor fixings.  Market contacts suggested central bank asset
purchases and refinancing operations possibly contributed to
lower Libor fixings.  Though an imperfect substitute for
interbank lending, the recent increase in banks’ holdings of
central bank reserves may have led to an easing in banks’
required funding through interbank markets.
Conditions in cross-currency swap markets also remained
more stable than during the acute period of stress in interbank
funding markets that occurred towards the end of 2008.  This
improvement coincided with reduced demand for the Bank’s
US dollar refinancing operations.  But the spread between 
the implied interest cost of borrowing US dollars via 
cross-currency swaps and US dollar domestic Libor remained
elevated compared to historical levels (Chart 14).
As well as reflecting a residual risk premium linked to the
possibility of future US dollar funding shortages, contacts also
suggested an increase in the supply of euros (perhaps as a
result of official operations) may have contributed to the
continued relative high cost of swapping euros into US dollars.
In addition, balance sheet constraints among financial
institutions still reportedly prevented them exploiting the
apparent arbitrage opportunity to eliminate or at least narrow
the relative cost of offshore and onshore US dollar funding.
Conditions in banks’ longer-term funding markets continued to
improve.  In the United Kingdom, the volume of unguaranteed
debt issuance increased, reflecting reports of improved
investor demand for unguaranteed debt (Chart 15).  
Robust investor demand helped narrow spreads for
unguaranteed bank debt, reducing the cost of issuance.
Contacts also suggested banks may have preferred to issue
unguaranteed debt as a signal of financial soundness and to
issue at maturities beyond those allowed under Credit
Guarantee Scheme rules.
A number of European banks successfully completed
subordinated debt issues.  In addition, some banks continued
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Sources:  Bloomberg, Reuters and Bank calculations.
(a) For more details, see 2008 Q2 Quarterly Bulletin, page 134, Chart 26 and 
BIS Quarterly Review, March 2008, pages 73–86.
Chart 14 Three-month US dollar Libor rates and implied














(a) Issuance with a value greater than US$500 million equivalent and original maturity greater
than one year.
(b) Senior debt issued under HM Treasury’s Credit Guarantee Scheme.
















Source:  Markit Group Limited.
(a) Unweighted averages of five-year CDS prices.
(b) Average of BBVA, BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Santander,
Société Générale, UBS and UniCredit.
(c) Average of Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds, RBS and Standard Chartered.
(d) Average of Bank of America, Citi, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan and Morgan Stanley.
Chart 13 Major international banks’ credit default swap
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were trading below par, to boost core capital ratios.  However,
prospects for hybrid subordinated debt issuance were more
uncertain.  Contacts said this reflected concerns about 
future regulatory changes and speculated that going forward,
hybrid debt would be less important in banks’ capital
structures.
In other bank funding markets, global issuance of asset-backed
securities (ABS) remained low by historical standards 
(Chart 16).  But this was partly offset by private issuance to be
used in the various official schemes to provide short-term
liquidity in securitisation markets.  In the United States, ABS
issuance under the Federal Reserve’s Term Asset-Backed
Securities Loan Facility (TALF) continued to make up the
majority of US ABS issuance. 
In the United Kingdom in August, the Bank launched a secured
commercial paper facility as part of its Asset Purchase Facility
(APF), in which the APF would stand ready to buy qualifying
asset-backed commercial paper in both primary and secondary
markets.  And in the euro area, by the end of August the ECB
had purchased 15% of its planned €60 billion of purchases of
covered bonds, which market contacts thought was helpful in
encouraging primary issuance and contributed to the
narrowing of spreads on covered bonds.
Besides the various official policy actions to directly support
ABS markets, contacts also highlighted a number of other
factors, which might help foster recovery in demand for
securitised instruments.  These included the adoption of
simpler securitisation structures, increased credit
enhancement, and better-quality loan pools.
Long-term interest rates 
International government bond yields generally ended the
period lower, particularly at longer maturities (Chart 17).
However, long-term forward rates continued to be volatile
(Chart 18).  Contacts said this reflected the impact of various
factors at different times, including news about economic
activity, changes in investor risk appetite and policy
announcements.
For example, yields were affected by central bank actions, such
as the purchases of US Treasuries by the US Federal Reserve
and gilts by the Bank of England.  In the United Kingdom, gilt
yields fell following the MPC’s announcement on 6 August that
it would extend its purchase programme by £50 billion.  Gilt
yields fell again following the publication of the MPC minutes
on 19 August, which revealed that some members voted for a
larger increase.
Official purchase schemes could be thought to affect
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Sources:  Dealogic and Bank calculations.
(a)  Non-retained residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS) issuance has been proxied by
issuance that is eligible for inclusion in underwriting league tables, while retained issuance
has been proxied by issuance that is not eligible for inclusion.
(b) Quarterly issuance. ‘Other’ includes auto, credit card and student loans ABS. 
(c) Commercial mortgage-backed securities.
(d) This includes RMBS used as collateral in central bank operations.
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(a) Instantaneous forward rates derived from the Bank’s government liability curves.


















(a) Derived from the Bank’s government liability curves.
Chart 18 International five-year nominal interest rates,
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their asset portfolios.  Specifically, central bank purchases may,
in the absence of substitute assets, encourage investors to pay
more for particular bonds, which, other things being equal,
would reduce their yields.
Since this factor should not affect OIS rates, its impact may be
evident from moves in the spread between bond yields and
equivalent-maturity OIS rates (to the extent that the latter
proxy default-free rates).  Indeed, Chart 19 shows that since
the MPC’s asset purchase programme was announced, 
gilt-OIS spreads have narrowed.  The fact that these spreads
fell further than equivalent spreads in other currencies may
reflect the relatively large size of the Bank’s gilt purchase
programme.  The MPC’s £175 billion purchase programme
represents around 30% of the outstanding stock of gilts, while
the US Federal Reserve’s intended purchase of $300 billion of 
US Treasuries represents less than 5% of the outstanding stock.
Moves in government bond yields may also reflect changes in
investors’ perceptions of macroeconomic prospects (which
themselves could be affected by policy announcements about
the scale of asset purchases).  However, contacts suggested
that, in general, perceptions of the macroeconomic outlook
improved over the period, which, all other things being equal,
would have tended to increase bond yields.
International long-term real forward rates ended the period
slightly higher in sterling and a little lower in US dollar and
euro (Chart 20).  More generally, long-term real interest rates
remained relatively stable across currencies and there were few
signs that the projected sharp increases in fiscal deficits in a
number of countries had materially pushed up the long-term
real cost of government borrowing.
Similarly, despite the significant expansion in central bank
balance sheets and associated increases in base money, 
long-term inflation forwards remained broadly stable
internationally.  Indeed, sterling inflation forwards — as
implied by both index-linked gilts and inflation swaps — fell
slightly over recent months.  Sterling inflation forward rates
were also less volatile than in previous periods (Chart 21),
which market contacts attributed to improved liquidity
conditions in inflation-linked bond markets.  And a 
forward-looking measure derived from options prices
suggested that the implied probability of extremely low or
high future RPI inflation in the United Kingdom generally fell.
(See box on page 163 for more discussion of this measure.)
EME and corporate credit markets
Yields on bonds issued in emerging market economies (EMEs)
and by firms in industrial economies also fell, and generally by
more than interest rates on government bonds issued by the
major economies.  As a result, spreads on EME sovereign and
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Sources:  Bank of England and Bloomberg.
(a) Nominal ten-year spot yields.




















(a) Derived from the Bank’s government liability curves.
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(a) Derived from the Bank’s inflation swap curve.
(b) Derived from the Bank’s government liability curve.
(c) Rolling standard deviation of forward RPI inflation derived from the Bank’s government
liability curve, based on a three-month estimation window.
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UK RPI inflation options
Options which have pay-offs linked to the level of the UK retail
price index (RPI) or year-on-year RPI inflation outturns have
existed for some time.  But they typically trade between
private counterparties (ie are ‘over-the-counter’) rather than
on a recognised exchange and as a result, information on their
prices have not been widely available.  Recently, however,
some investment banks have started to publish indicative
prices for these types of options.  This box reviews these data
and what they imply about investors’ views about future
developments in retail prices in the United Kingdom.
RPI inflation options are the most frequently traded and take
two forms:  inflation caps, which pay out when annual inflation
is above a pre-determined level, or ‘strike’;  and inflation floors,
which pay out when inflation is below a pre-determined level.
Prices for caps and floors are normally quoted for maturities of
3 to 30 years, with strike prices for floors typically from 0% to
3%, and for caps from 3% to 6%.  In exchange for an upfront
premium, the purchaser of a cap at 5% will receive an interest
payment on the notional value of the option that is the
maximum of zero, and the annual rate of RPI inflation 
minus 5%.  So if the purchaser bought an option worth a
notional amount of £100 million and inflation was 6% in the
first year, the payout for that year would be £1 million, ie
(6%–5%) * £100 million. 
According to contacts, the majority of trading in RPI inflation
caps and floors arises from the need for pension funds to
hedge their liabilities.  Specifically, a large proportion of UK
pension funds’ liabilities must be revalued each year by the
annual RPI inflation rate — to compensate pension scheme
members for any erosion in the real value of the payouts — up
to a maximum of 5%.  At the same time, the value of future
pension liabilities cannot typically be reduced in the event that
RPI inflation turns negative (ie the aggregate price level falls
over any one-year period).  This process of annual revaluation
of liabilities is known as limited price indexation (LPI).  
Pension funds will typically look to hedge their exposure to
inflation indexation using regular RPI-linked financial
instruments, such as index-linked gilts and inflation swaps.
But these instruments offer an imperfect hedge should
inflation increase above 5% (since the uplift in their liabilities
are typically capped at that level) or if annual RPI inflation is
negative (in which case their liabilities do not fall but they will
have to pay out on a swap or lose principal on a bond).  Hence
caps and floors can be used to achieve an improved hedge
against the effects on indexation of their liabilities.
There are some institutions/organisations that are natural
suppliers of RPI inflation protection, such as the UK
government and utility companies, whose revenues are often
linked in some way to RPI inflation.  But in contrast there are
few natural providers of protection against some form of
constrained RPI inflation (ie LPI) and therefore no natural
supply of RPI inflation options.  Instead, the supply of RPI
floors has largely relied upon the ability of the sellers of those
options to absorb the risk (given they are exposing themselves
to inflation volatility).  Relatedly, market activity in UK
inflation caps and floors has typically been low compared to
other inflation-linked products and options on other measures
of inflation;  notably euro-area CPI.
The general reduction in risk-taking in inflation-linked markets,
particularly through 2008, reportedly led to a fall in activity in
inflation option markets.  This reduction in activity was
exacerbated when RPI inflation became more volatile.  Trading
in inflation floors was also affected once it became clear that
RPI inflation would turn negative in 2009 leading to losses for
some market makers.  
Despite the low level of market activity, prices of RPI inflation
caps and floors were still quoted.  Hence it is possible to use
these to obtain an illustrative average implied probability
distribution for annual RPI inflation.  One method of achieving
this is by comparing the prices of caps and floors for different
strike prices at different maturities to create histograms which
show the indicative (risk-neutral) probabilities attached to
inflation being within the different ranges.  Chart A shows the
development of such an average indicative market-implied
probability distribution for RPI inflation over 2009 at the five
to seven-year horizon.  In general the distribution suggests
that the average probability attached to high RPI inflation
outcomes fell compared with earlier in the year, while the
probability attached to outcomes less than 4% generally rose.
However, these developments may not solely reflect changes
in the true probabilities attached to particular inflation
outcomes but could arise from changes in investors’ desired
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Sources:  RBS and Bank calculations.
(a) Implied from prices of options on UK RPI inflation. 
(b) Probability that RPI inflation will fall within a 0.5% range, centred on x-axis value (except for
the distribution tails which extend for noted value onwards).
Chart A Average probability distribution of annual RPI
outturns for 5–7 years ahead implied from options(a)164 Quarterly Bulletin  2009 Q3
narrowed further (Chart 22).  Among investment-grade
companies, the narrowing in spreads was similar on securities
issued by financial and non-financial companies (Chart 23).
According to contacts, the narrowing in credit spreads
reflected perceived improvements in the macroeconomic
outlook, some pickup in investor risk appetite as well as an
improvement in market liquidity.  Indeed, a simple model
decomposition suggests that the narrowing in EME sovereign
bond spreads since Autumn 2008 was more than accounted
for by increased risk appetite and improved market liquidity
(see box on page 165).
Consistent with improved liquidity conditions in corporate
bond markets, the difference between corporate bond spreads
and CDS premia — the CDS-bond basis — implied a reduction
in illiquidity premia in corporate bond spreads, particularly for
corporates that had issued in US dollars (Chart 24).(1) More
generally, contacts reported improved functioning in corporate
bond markets, with some increase in market-making activity.
In the United Kingdom, the improvement in corporate credit
conditions was aided by APF purchases of corporate bonds,
with contacts noting that the reduction in gilt yields had also
made corporate assets more attractive for investors. 
Coinciding with stronger investor demand for corporate debt,
gross bond issuance by non-financial companies remained
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Sources:  JPMorgan Chase and Co. and Merrill Lynch.



















Source:  JPMorgan Chase and Co.
(a) Spreads of corporate bond yields over equivalent-maturity swap rates.
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Sources:  JPMorgan Chase and Co., UBS Delta and Bank calculations.
(a) Five-day moving average.  Note that the US dollar series is not strictly comparable to the
sterling and euro series.  The sterling and euro measures are constructed as asset swap
spreads less CDS premia for the median non-bank investment-grade corporate bond,
whereas the US dollar series is the median of eleven different sectoral bond-CDS basis
indices.

















Chart 25 Global non-financial corporate gross bond
issuance
(1) See the box, ‘Liquidity in corporate bond markets’, August 2009 Inflation Report, 
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What might lie behind the recent narrowing in
EME bond spreads?
Credit spreads on emerging market economies’ (EMEs)
sovereign bonds have narrowed markedly since Autumn 2008,
and approached levels last seen prior to the collapse of
Lehman Brothers.  This box uses a simple regression model to
investigate how much of this can be attributed to a better
economic outlook for EMEs (and hence lower compensation
for default risk) and how much reflects an improvement in the
investment environment linked to an increase in risk appetite
and overall market liquidity. 
A model of EME bond spreads
In an earlier Bulletin,(1) a simple econometric model of
monthly EME sovereign bond spreads was presented.  This
model related aggregate sovereign EME bond spreads
movements to three explanatory variables:(2)
• EME economic fundamentals measured by 
country-weighted sovereign credit ratings (RAT).
• A forward-looking measure of equity price volatility (VIX) to
proxy for investors’ risk appetite.
• A measure of financial market liquidity — the short-term 
US interest rate.  
Since then the model has been revised to include instead a
broader measure of liquidity (LIQ).(3) Importantly, the revised
model was better able to capture movements in EME bond
spreads during the marked turbulence in financial markets
witnessed since last autumn.
More formally, the ‘new’ regression model on the (log of the)
EME bond spread (LSP) can be written as:
where the terms in brackets represent the expected signs of
the coefficients and ξt captures random disturbances that
cannot be accounted for by the model.
Chart A shows that over the past ten years this simple model
can explain movements in EME bond spreads reasonably well,
including during the period of marked turbulence last autumn.
Indeed the three explanatory variables accounted for 92% of
the variation in spreads over this period.
Accounting for the change in EME bond spreads
This regression model is a reduced form rather than a
structural relationship, which means that it is difficult to
attach a causal link between spreads and the various potential
explanatory variables.  That is, the model will capture the
statistical comovement between variables, but will not
necessarily explain why they move together.  Moreover, in
practice the interaction between spreads and indicators of
EMEs’ credit standing and financial market conditions may be
more dynamic than this simple parsimonious equation would
suggest.  So the model should be thought of as representing
the long-run or ‘equilibrium’ relationship between the
variables.
Nevertheless, based on past empirical regularities, the model
may be helpful in assessing the extent to which movements in
spreads reflect changes in economic fundamentals and market
conditions. 
Table 1 provides the model-based decomposition of the
narrowing in EME spreads since their local peak last November.
It suggests that the narrowing of spreads is consistent with the
increase in investor risk appetite and, to a lesser extent, in
market liquidity.  According to the model, these factors have
more than offset the effects of the apparent deterioration in
economic fundamentals over the period as indicated by ratings
changes, which, other things being equal, would have tended
to widen bond spreads.  The role of increased risk appetite and
improved market liquidity was also reflected in bond spreads
narrowing most for lower-rated sovereigns.
LSP RAT LIQ VIX tt t t t =+ + + +
−−+















Sources:  Bloomberg, IMF, JPMorgan Chase and Co. and Bank calculations.
(a) Refers to the composite JPMorgan Emerging Markets Bond Index Global excluding defaulted
bonds.
(b) The fitted values are based on a regression of log values of EME sovereign bond spreads on
ratings, a measure of market liquidity and the VIX index over the January 1998 to 
August 2009 period.
Chart A EME bond spreads:(a) actual and fitted
Table 1 Accounting for the change in EME spreads, 
November 2008–August 2009
Basis points contribution of:
Credit rating (RAT) +105
Market liquidity (LIQ) -175
Risk appetite (VIX) -405
Unexplained +115
Total change in actual bond spreads -360
(1) See the box ‘A simple model for emerging market bond spreads’ on pages 14–15 of the
Spring 2006 Quarterly Bulletin.
(2) The index for EMEs used in the estimations is JPMorgan Chase and Co.’s Emerging
Market Bond Index Global excluding defaulted bonds.
(3) The index is an unweighted average of eight liquidity measures.  See ‘Financial market
liquidity’, Financial Stability Report, April 2007, page 18.  166 Quarterly Bulletin  2009 Q3
pickup in issuance by non-investment grade corporates, a
market which effectively closed from end-2008 until recently.
Some of the recent issuance of corporate bonds was reported
to have been used to repay bank loans.  Overall, firms’ net
total debt external financing turned negative in 2009 Q2
(Chart 26).  Some of this balance sheet deleveraging by
corporates could be linked to reduced supply of long-term
bank credit.  But it could also be that companies wanted to
decrease the risk that they might find it difficult to refinance
some of their loans maturing over the next few years 
(Chart 27).
Commercial paper issuance by non-financial firms in Europe
was relatively muted (Chart 28), despite the reported limited
availability of short-term bank credit.  This could perhaps
reflect continued low business activity and the impact of de-
stocking on the need for working capital.  It may also be
related to corporates having improved access to the corporate
bond market to raise longer-term funds.
Equity markets
Accompanying the pickup in corporate bond issuance, firms’
issuance of equity capital remained strong.  This occurred
against the backdrop of further increases in global equity
indices (Chart 29), with the recovery in equity prices being
relatively broad-based across countries.  Despite the recent
rally, however, equity prices remained well below their levels
prior to the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. 
Recent increases in equity prices coincided with investment
analysts starting to revise upwards their expectations for 
near-term corporate earnings, given signs of some
improvement in the macroeconomic outlook.  The August
Bank of America/Merrill Lynch survey suggested that global
fund managers believed that global corporate earnings could
rise by at least 10% over the next year.  Similarly, dividend
yields inferred from dividend swap prices rose markedly across
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Indices:  2 Jan. 2008 = 100
Previous Bulletin
Source:  Bloomberg.
(a) The MSCI Emerging Markets Index is a capitalisation-weighted index that monitors the
performance of stocks in emerging markets.
Chart 29 International equity indices (in US dollars)(a)Recent economic and financial developments Markets and operations 167
However, the increases in implied dividends could be partly
related to reduced compensation for uncertainty surrounding
future dividends rather than a shift up in expectations of future
payouts.  More generally, to the extent that investors’
perceptions about macroeconomic uncertainty have fallen,
perhaps linked to the various policy stimulus packages put in
place, the recent continued pickup in global stock prices could
reflect further reductions in required equity risk premia.
Consistent with lower compensation for risk, information from
options prices indicated that the implied distribution of future
equity prices narrowed and became slightly less negatively
skewed, implying that investors were less concerned about
large future falls in equity indices (Chart 31). 
Foreign exchange
Information from options prices indicated that investors’
perceptions of uncertainty surrounding future exchange rates
also declined further (Chart 2 on page 154).  This was true 
for currencies of industrialised and emerging market 
countries.
Accompanying the falls in currency volatility, liquidity
conditions in foreign exchange markets reportedly continued
to improve over recent months.  In particular, in the 
interdealer segment of the market, transaction costs (as
measured by bid-ask spreads) drifted lower, further unwinding
the increases in late 2008.
In terms of the levels of exchange rates, the major currencies
ended the period little changed.  The sterling effective
exchange rate (£ERI) had appreciated through June and July
but this was reversed in August.  The most persistent move
over the quarter was the depreciation of the US dollar,
continuing a trend that began in early March (Chart 32).
According to contacts, the US dollar’s continued depreciation
was partly linked to the revival in global risk appetite that
might have underpinned the pickup in corporate bond, equity
and other risky asset prices.  They noted further unwinds of the
US dollar inflows witnessed in late 2008, when the US dollar
was said to have benefited from ‘safe haven’ flows and the
repatriation of funds back to the United States.
The depreciation of the US dollar since March was especially
marked against the Australian and New Zealand dollars 
(Chart 33), with market contacts noting that the inflows into
these currencies partly reflected the resurrection of so-called
carry trades (involving borrowing in low-yielding currencies to
invest in overseas assets with higher nominal returns, see box















Index points Index points
DJ Euro Stoxx (right-hand scale)
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Solid lines:  28 August 2009
Dashed lines:  22 May 2009
(a) From exchange-traded futures contracts.
(b) For more details on dividend swaps, see box on ‘Dividend swaps’, Bank of England Quarterly
Bulletin, 2008 Q4, page 371.
Chart 30 Dividend swap prices(a)(b)





Dashed lines are 
  futures prices
Sources:  Euronext.liffe and Bank calculations.
(a) For more details, see Clews, R, Panigirtzoglou, N and Proudman, J (2000), ‘Recent
developments in extracting information from options markets’, Bank of England Quarterly
Bulletin, February, pages 50–60.



















Chart 32 Cumulative changes in international ERIs since
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Bank of England operations
Asset purchases(1)
In the week prior to the August MPC meeting, the Bank
completed the programme of private and public sector asset
purchases financed by the issuance of central bank reserves
that had been announced on 5 March and extended to 
£125 billion on 7 May.  On 6 August, the MPC voted to
continue with this programme of asset purchases and to
increase its size by £50 billion to £175 billion.  Table A and
Chart 34 summarise asset purchases by type of asset.(2)
Gilts
Gilt purchases financed by the issuance of central bank
reserves began on 11 March.  Initially, the Bank offered to
purchase conventional gilts with a minimum residual maturity
of five years and a maximum residual maturity of 25 years.  
Following the MPC’s decision on 6 August to purchase an
additional £50 billion of assets over the subsequent three
months, the Bank announced that it would extend the range of
gilts eligible for purchase to include all conventional gilts with
a minimum residual maturity of greater than three years.  In
addition to conducting auctions to purchase gilts on Monday
and Wednesday each week, the Bank would hold an additional
auction, normally on Tuesday.  The Bank would normally offer
to purchase gilts with a residual maturity of 10–25 years on
Mondays, of greater than 25 years on Tuesdays and 3–10 years
on Wednesdays.  The Bank also announced, in a joint
statement with the Debt Management Office (DMO), an
arrangement for a significant amount of the gilts acquired by
the Bank via the APF to be made available for on-lending to
the market by the DMO through the DMO’s normal repo
market activity (see box on page 169).
As of 27 August, £135 billion of gilts had been purchased, of
which £65.6 billion were in the 3–10 year residual maturity
range, £65.2 billion in the 10–25 year maturity range and 
£4.2 billion with a maturity greater than 25 years 
(Chart 35).












Percentage point contribution to the US dollar ERI
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–
Sources:  Bloomberg and Bank calculations.
(a) 9 March 2009 was the local peak in the US dollar ERI.
Chart 33 Changes in US dollar bilateral exchange rates
and the US dollar ERI since 9 March 2009(a)
Table A Asset purchases by type (£ millions)
Week ending(a) Commercial Gilts Corporate Total(b)
paper bonds
21 May 2009(c)(d) 2,240 63,994 625 66,859
28 May 2009 701 6,501 48 7,250
4 June 2009 85 6,509 41 6,635
11 June 2009 458 6,388 10 6,856
18 June 2009 263 6,476 26 6,765
25 June 2009 130 6,500 24 6,654
2 July 2009 80 6,500 49 6,629
9 July 2009 34 6,505 48 6,587
16 July 2009 186 4,500 21 4,707
23 July 2009 25 4,498 0 4,523
30 July 2009 0 4,004 0 4,004
6 August 2009 0 0 0 0
13 August 2009 75 4,197 3 4,275
20 August 2009 166 4,200 10 4,376
27 August 2009 399 4,200 19 4,618
Total financed by Treasury bills – – – –
Total financed by central 
bank reserves(d) 1,573 134,971 938 137,482
Total asset purchases(d) 1,573 134,971 938 137,482
(a) Week-ended amounts are in terms of the proceeds paid to counterparties, on a trade-day basis, rounded to
the nearest million.  Data are aggregated for purchases from the Friday to the following Thursday.
(b) Weekly values may not sum to totals due to rounding.
(c) 21 May 2009 measured as amount outstanding as at 21 May 2009.
(d) In terms of proceeds paid to counterparties less redemptions at initial purchase price on a settled basis.
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(a) Amounts are in terms of the proceeds paid to counterparties, less redemptions valued at
initial purchase price, rounded to the nearest million.  Data based on settled transactions.
Chart 34 Cumulative APF asset purchase by type(a)
(1) The data cut-off for this subsection is 27 August.  
(2) The objectives and operation of the APF are described in more detail in the 2009 Q2
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Gilt lending
On 6 August, the Bank and the Debt Management Office
(DMO) announced that, from 7 August, the Bank would make
available to the DMO a significant amount of the gilts
purchased via the Asset Purchase Facility (APF) for on-lending
to the market through the DMO’s normal repo market activity.
The purpose of this arrangement is to relieve any frictions in
the functioning of the market in specific gilts arising from the
Bank’s purchases.  The DMO may lend the gilts for a term of up
to one week.  In return for the loan of specific APF gilts, the
DMO delivers to the Bank UK government securities of
equivalent value, so that the APF’s holdings of UK government
securities are unaffected.  There is no net impact on the DMO’s
cash management operations.
The amount available is at least 10% of the APF’s holdings of
each stock, and more where the APF’s holding is greater than
50% of the ‘free float’.(1) In addition, the Bank is prepared to
make the APF’s gilts available for use in the DMO’s Standing,
and Special Repo Facilities.(2)
Market participants suggested that the impact of the lending
facility could be seen in the repo rates for the three bonds that
had been eligible for the DMO’s Special Repo Facility (the 5%
2014, 5% 2018 and 4.75% 2020).  For each of these three
bonds, the spread between its weighted average overnight
repo rate and the general secured overnight repo rate was
consistently over 30 basis points in July and early August.  This
meant that to obtain any of these specific bonds, market
participants would in return have had to lend cash at a rate
significantly below the general secured overnight rate.  On the
first day this facility was available, spreads on these bonds fell
below 20 basis points and subsequently remained below the
levels seen in July and early August (Chart A).
A further consequence of the launch of this facility has been
the fall in usage of the DMO’s Standing and Special Repo
Facilities.  Between 1 July and 6 August, the average total daily
use for these facilities had been around £2 billion, with over
95% of the usage involving the three bonds highlighted in the
chart.  Since the launch of this facility, there was no use of
either facility, as market participants were able to access the
bonds via the new facility at rates closer to the secured
overnight rate, thus reducing the spread.  On 28 August, the
DMO announced the suspension of the Special Repo Facility.
The Bank will publish the daily average aggregate value of gilts
lent by the APF to the DMO during each calendar quarter, on
the second Wednesday after the end of the quarter at 10 am. 
(1) Total issue size of the gilt minus government holdings. 
(2) The Standing Facility allows any gilt to be borrowed overnight at a current rate of
0.10%, with a simultaneous reverse repo trade executed at Bank Rate.  In the event of
persistent dislocation, the DMO may establish a Special Repo Facility.  This operates in
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Chart A Spread to GC overnight rate of gilts available in
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These gilt purchases took place over 50 auctions, which varied
in size up to a maximum of £3.5 billion.  The auctions following
the 6 August MPC decision were reduced in size to £1.4 billion.
Cover in the auctions varied, but averaged 3.3 in the 3–10 year
auctions, 2.4 in the 10–25 year auctions and 2.6 in the
auctions for gilts with a maturity greater than 25 years 
(Chart 36).(1)
As purchases progressed, the Bank acquired a sizable
proportion (around 70%) of the free float (the total issue size
of the gilt minus government holdings) in four gilts.  These gilts
were subsequently suspended from auctions until further
notice.(2)
Commercial paper
Over the review period, the Bank continued to offer to
purchase sterling-denominated investment-grade commercial
paper (CP) issued by companies that make a material
contribution to UK economic activity.  
As of 27 August, APF holdings of CP amounted to £1.6 billion,
down from £2.2 billion as of 21 May.  Between 21 May and 
27 August gross purchases of £2.6 billion were more than
offset by redemptions of £3.3 billion.  While APF holdings over
the period fell, the total amount of sterling-denominated CP
outstanding for UK corporate and non-bank financial firms was
slightly higher than on 21 May (Chart 37).
Sterling primary market CP spreads narrowed further since the
previous Bulletin (Chart 38).  The narrowing of spreads,
combined with the fall in APF net purchases and the increase in
the total amount of sterling-denominated CP outstanding for
UK corporate and non-bank financial firms, would seem to
suggest that some issuers found it more economic to issue to
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(a) On 6 August, the short-maturity bucket changed from 5–10 years to 3–10 years.  The
medium and long-maturity buckets are 10–25 years and greater than 25 years respectively.
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Sources:  CP Ware and Bank calculations.
Chart 37 Sterling commercial paper outstanding for UK
corporates and non-bank financial firms
(1) Further details of individual operations are available at
www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/apf/gilts/results.htm.
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(a) Spread to OIS rates.
Chart 38 Primary market spreads on sterling 
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Corporate bonds
The Bank continued to offer to purchase high-quality
corporate bonds, through auctions, typically on Tuesdays,
Thursdays and Fridays.
From Thursday 16 July to Thursday 6 August the Bank did not
make any purchases in its corporate bond auctions.  This
largely reflected a decline in offers over this period with the
Bank receiving no offers in five consecutive auctions from 
24 July to 4 August.  Contacts suggested that continued strong
investor demand combined with little primary market issuance
during the summer had resulted in investors finding it more
difficult to obtain sterling corporate bonds.  These factors may
in part explain the reduction in activity in the Bank’s auctions
during July and early August, and consequently the fall in the
number of successful offers (Chart 39).
As of 27 August, total corporate bond purchases were 
£0.9 billion, compared to £0.6 billion on 21 May.  The portfolio
had been acquired through 386 purchases of 118 bonds from
50 issuers, spread over auctions from 25 March to 27 August.(1)
This reflected the aim of the Bank to make frequent but
relatively small purchases to help improve the function of the
secondary market, to help to reduce liquidity premia on 
high-quality corporate bonds, and so improve firms’ access to
capital markets. 
Credit Guarantee Scheme
The Bank did not make any purchases of bank debt issued
under the Credit Guarantee Scheme from the secondary
market, but stands ready to do so should conditions in that
market deteriorate.
Secured commercial paper facility
On 3 August, the Bank launched a secured commercial paper
(SCP) facility to support the provision of working capital to
non-investment grade companies that are ineligible for the
Bank’s CP facility.  The purpose of the SCP facility is to help
improve the functioning of the private market by standing
ready to make primary market purchases and by acting as a
backstop for secondary market investors. 
SCP issuers are programmes that are administered by
sponsors, which it is anticipated will typically be banks.  To be
eligible for purchase by the APF, SCP must be backed by
underlying assets that are short term and provide credit to
companies (for example, trade receivables or equipment
leases) or consumers (for example, credit cards or short-term
loans), where the credit would support economic activity in
the United Kingdom.  Programmes that include assets such as
term asset-backed security bonds, emerging market
transactions and synthetic assets are likely to be ineligible for
the SCP facility.  
Eligible SCP programmes must have a minimum initial 
short-term credit rating of A1/P1/F1 from at least two of
Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch.
There were no programmes that were immediately eligible for
the SCP facility.  As part of the consultation process, banks
indicated that it would take a number of months to set up
programmes that would be eligible for the SCP facility.  As with
the CP facility, it is intended that the facility would operate for
as long as the highly abnormal conditions in corporate credit
markets persist, and the Bank intends to give twelve months
notice of any withdrawal of the facility.(2)
Operations within the sterling monetary framework(3)
Following the introduction of asset purchases financed by the
creation of central bank reserves, the Bank’s operational
approach initially aimed to ensure a net supply of reserves
around the aggregate level of reserves targets initially set by
participants for the March maintenance period, plus the
amount of reserves injected via the Bank’s programme of asset
purchases (Chart 40).  In the light of the revealed demand for
central bank reserves, the Bank announced on 6 August that it
would amend its operational approach to the provision of
reserves.  The Bank would continue to offer reserves in 
long-term repo open market operations (OMOs) but would
cease to offer reserves in a weekly short-term OMO.  The level
of reserves would thus be determined by (i) the level of
reserves injected via asset purchases, (ii) the reserves supplied
in long-term repo OMOs, and (iii) the net impact of other
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(a) Weekly (Friday-Thursday) amounts in terms of the proceeds paid to counterparties, on a
trade-day basis.
Chart 39 Weekly purchases of sterling corporate
bonds(a)
(1) Sum of corporate bonds purchased, less redemptions valued at initial purchase price.
(2) The SCP facility is described in more detail in the Market Notice available at
www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/marketnotice090730.pdf.
(3) This subsection and the subsection describing other market operations, cover
operations from 7 May to 5 August.  On 5 March, the usual system, in which banks
chose monthly reserves targets to achieve on average over a maintenance period, was
suspended.  However, this article continues to use the term ‘maintenance period’ for
convenience to refer to the period between one MPC decision date and the next.172 Quarterly Bulletin  2009 Q3
Long-term repo OMOs
Repo operations at six, nine and twelve-month maturities were
offered against collateral routinely accepted in the Bank’s
short-term OMOs and Operational Standing Facilities (OSFs).
In addition, the Bank continued to provide liquidity insurance
by conducting extended-collateral long-term repo OMOs with
a three-month maturity against a wider range of collateral.
The results of these operations are shown in Table B.
All three-month extended-collateral long-term repo OMOs
over the review period were uncovered, resulting in a decline in
the stock of long-term repo OMOs outstanding (Chart 41).  In
light of revealed demand for funds in these operations, the
Bank reduced the amount on offer from £20 billion to 
£15 billion from the operation on 14 July.  A further reduction
from £15 billion to £10 billion was announced on 6 August.  In
contrast, all operations at six, nine and twelve-month
maturities against routine OMO collateral were covered 
(Table C). 
For the period under review, the Bank continued to announce
two minimum bid rates applicable to its extended-collateral
three-month long-term repo OMOs.  The minimum rate for
bids against routine OMO collateral was set equal to the
higher of the equivalent-maturity OIS rate shortly before the
operation and the maximum bid rate in the Bank’s short-term
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Range within which reserves remunerated(a)
Additional provision from asset purchases ﬁnanced by central bank reserves
Additional provision resulting from uncovered OMO drains
Additional provision in ﬁne-tuning OMOs
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£ billions
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(a) Since 5 March, all reserves balances held by reserves banks have been remunerated at 
Bank Rate.
Chart 40 Aggregate reserves targets and reserves
provision
Table B Extended-collateral three-month long-term repo
operations
19 May 2009
On offer (£ millions) 20,000 
Cover 0.54
Weighted average rate(a) 0.868
Lowest accepted rate(a) 0.600
Tail(b) 0.27
2 June 2009
On offer (£ millions) 20,000 
Cover 0.45
Weighted average rate(a) 0.722
Lowest accepted rate(a) 0.600
Tail(b) 0.12
16 June 2009
On offer (£ millions) 20,000 
Cover 0.53
Weighted average rate(a) 0.729
Lowest accepted rate(a) 0.600
Tail(b) 0.13
30 June 2009
On offer (£ millions) 20,000 
Cover 0.42
Weighted average rate(a) 0.602
Lowest accepted rate(a) 0.600
Tail(b) 0.00
14 July 2009
On offer (£ millions) 15,000
Cover 0.09
Weighted average rate(a) 1.097
Lowest accepted rate(a) 0.600
Tail(b) 0.50
4 August 2009
On offer (£ millions) 15,000
Cover 0.55
Weighted average rate(a) 0.898
Lowest accepted rate(a) 0.600
Tail(b) 0.30
(a) Per cent.
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Chart 41 Factors affecting the supply of reserves
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collateral pool was set 50 basis points higher than for bids
against narrow collateral.  On 6 August the Bank announced a
change in the process for determining the minimum bid rate.
For routine OMO collateral, the minimum bid rate would be
set at the higher of the equivalent-maturity OIS rate and Bank
Rate.  For bids against the wider collateral pool, the minimum
bid rate remained 50 basis points higher than that for routine
OMO collateral.
Short-term operations
Following the introduction of asset purchases financed by the
creation of central bank reserves, initially the Bank continued
to conduct weekly short-term OMOs to drain reserves by
issuing one-week bills, such that the level of reserves would be
around the aggregate level of reserves targets initially set by
participants for the March maintenance period, plus the
amount of reserves injected via the Bank’s programme of asset
purchases.  These operations to drain reserves were 
variable-rate operations.
The size of these weekly operations to drain reserves fell from
£27.5 billion in the operation on 7 May to £8.4 billion on 
11 June, as fewer reserves were supplied in the Bank’s 
long-term repo operations (Chart 42).  A further reduction in
the reserves supplied in the long-term repo OMO on 16 June
resulted in aggregate reserves reaching a level broadly in line
with the Bank’s operational target at the time.  Consequently,
the Bank chose not to conduct a short-term OMO on 18 and
25 June.
Further net maturities in long-term repo OMOs resulted in
aggregate reserves, excluding those injected via asset
purchases, falling below the level implied by the Bank’s
operational target at the time.  As a result, the Bank reverted
to supplying reserves via variable-rate short-term operations
from 2 July (Chart 42).  These operations were suspended on 
6 August in line with the revised operational approach
described above. 
Operational Standing Facilities
As part of the changes to the sterling monetary framework
introduced on 5 March, the Bank announced that, if Bank Rate
was set at 0.5% or below, the rate paid on the Operational
Standing Deposit Facility would be zero, while the rate charged
on the Operational Standing Lending Facility would continue
to be set at 25 basis points above Bank Rate. 
As a result of the change to remunerate all reserves balances
at Bank Rate and (given the level of Bank Rate) the reduction
in the rate paid on the Operational Standing Deposit Facility to
zero, average use of the deposit facility was £0 million in each
of the maintenance periods under review.  Average usage of
the lending facility was also £0 million throughout the period. 
Discount Window Facility
In October 2008, the Bank introduced a Discount Window
Facility (DWF) as part of the framework for its operations in
the sterling money markets.  The DWF is a permanent facility
to provide liquidity insurance to the banking system and
allows eligible banks and building societies to borrow gilts
against a wide range of collateral.  
On 7 July the Bank announced that the average daily amount
outstanding in the Discount Window Facility between 
1 January and 31 March 2009 was £0 million.
Table C Long-term repo operations
Six-month Nine-month Twelve-month
19 May 2009
On offer (£ millions) 750  400  200 
Cover 4.00 4.00 4.00
Weighted average rate(a) 0.567 0.603 0.708
Highest accepted rate(a) 0.590 0.650 0.730
Lowest accepted rate(a) 0.551 0.551 0.701
Tail(b) 0.02 0.05 0.01
16 June 2009
On offer (£ millions) 750 400 200
Cover 3.27 3.81 3.10
Weighted average rate(a) 0.596 0.654 0.753
Highest accepted rate(a) 0.650 0.700 0.753
Lowest accepted rate(a) 0.550 0.651 0.753
Tail(b) 0.05 0.00 0.00
14 July 2009
On offer (£ millions) 750 400 200
Cover 2.33 2.63 3.25
Weighted average rate(a) 0.501 0.601 0.741
Highest accepted rate(a) 0.501 0.601 0.741
Lowest accepted rate(a) 0.501 0.601 0.741
Tail(b) 0.00 0.00 0.00
(a) Per cent.
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(a) Size of OMOs shown as weekly average amounts outstanding.
Chart 42 Size of short-term OMOs and cover ratio(a)174 Quarterly Bulletin  2009 Q3
Other market operations
One objective of the Bank’s market operations is to reduce the
cost of disruption to the liquidity and payments services
supplied by commercial banks.  The Bank does this by
balancing the provision of liquidity insurance against the costs
of creating incentives for banks to take greater risk, and subject
to the need to control the risk to its balance sheet.
Within the sterling monetary framework, the Bank provides
liquidity insurance through the provision of reserves accounts,
extended-collateral long-term repo OMOs and the Discount
Window Facility described above.  Liquidity insurance has also
been offered in other operations:  US dollar repo operations
and the Special Liquidity Scheme.
Special Liquidity Scheme
The drawdown period for the Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS)
closed on 30 January 2009.  Although the drawdown window
to access the SLS has closed, the Scheme will remain in place
for three years, thereby providing participating institutions
with continuing liquidity support.
US dollar repo operations
In concert with other central banks, since 18 September 2008
the Bank has offered US dollar financing to financial
institutions funded by a swap with the Federal Reserve.  These
measures are designed to improve the liquidity conditions in
global financial markets.  
There were no bids in the Bank’s one-week dollar operations.
Bids also declined for funds at longer maturities.  This led to a
corresponding fall in the total stock outstanding;  most
recently in August, when funds offered in July matured,
reducing the outstanding total in all US dollar repo operations
to £525 million (Chart 43).  The fall in the outstanding total is
represented in a fall in ‘other assets’ on the Bank’s balance
sheet (Chart 44) with a corresponding fall in US dollar
deposits from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (included
in ‘other liabilities’ in Chart 45).
The Bank had previously offered US dollar financing at 
one-week, one-month, and three-month maturities.  In light of
the generally reduced use of these operations, the Bank
announced on 25 June that — while the swap lines between
the Federal Reserve and the Bank had been extended to 
1 February 2010 — the one-month operation would be
suspended following the operation on 28 July.
As previously announced, since 6 April, the Bank, along with
other central banks, has had swap arrangements in place that
would enable the provision of foreign currency liquidity by the
Federal Reserve to US financial institutions.  Should it be
required, the Bank would provide sterling via a swap
arrangement with the Federal Reserve, similar to that which
underpins the Bank’s US dollar repo operations. 
Bank of England balance sheet
The Bank of England uses its balance sheet for policy purposes.
The expansion of its balance sheet since 2007, and more
especially since 2008, reflects the extraordinary policy
measures that it has adopted.  
Purchases of commercial paper, corporate bonds and gilts
under the APF described above, have since 5 March been the
main factor in the expansion of the Bank’s balance sheet.  APF
transactions are undertaken by a subsidiary company of the
Bank of England, the Bank of England Asset Purchase Facility
Fund Limited (BEAPFF).  The BEAPFF borrows from the Bank to
pay for the purchases it makes.  It is this lending to the BEAPFF
that appears on the Bank’s balance sheet as an asset under
‘other assets’ (Chart 44).  On the Bank’s balance sheet the
liability corresponding to this asset was initially a deposit from
the government’s Debt Management Office.  This deposit
appeared under ‘other liabilities’ (Chart 45).  Following the
decision by the MPC on 5 March to use the APF as a monetary
policy tool, the Bank financed its lending to BEAPFF by the
creation of central bank reserves.  This is reflected in an
increase in the level of reserves balances (Chart 45).
Over the period 27 May to 26 August, the Bank of England’s
balance sheet averaged £227 billion.  While this was down
from a high in 2008 Q4, it represented a rise from Q2.  This
increase reflected purchases of commercial paper, corporate
bonds and gilts under the APF, and the subsequent increase in
reserve balances on the liability side.  These increases to the
balance sheet were partially offset by the reduced size of
reserves provided in extended-collateral long-term repo
OMOs and the decreasing size of the Bank of England’s 















(a) Stock outstanding is shown from settlement date.
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Foreign reserves
As part of the monetary policy framework introduced by the
Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1997, the Bank of England holds
its own foreign exchange reserves in support of its monetary
policy objective.  These reserves are separate from the
Government’s foreign exchange reserves, which the Bank
manages as HM Treasury’s agent.  The assets held in the Bank’s
reserves are included in ‘bonds and other securities acquired
via market transactions’ (Chart 44).  They are financed with
medium-term foreign currency securities issued by the Bank
(Chart 45).  At the end of July the Bank’s foreign exchange
reserves comprised £3.9 billion of assets.
Capital portfolio
The Bank holds an investment portfolio that is approximately
the same size as its capital and reserves (net of equity
holdings, for example in the Bank for International Settlements
and European Central Bank, and the Bank’s physical assets),
and aggregate cash ratio deposits.  The portfolio consists of
sterling-denominated securities.  Securities purchased by the
Bank for this portfolio are normally held to maturity;
nevertheless sales may be made from time to time, reflecting
for example, risk management, liquidity management or
changes in investment policy.
The portfolio currently includes around £2.9 billion of gilts and
£1 billion of other debt securities.  Since April 2009, both the
size of the purchases (£43 million, previously £20 million) and
the frequency (bi-monthly rather than monthly) have
increased reflecting developments in the Bank’s capital and
reserves.  Over the period from 7 May to 5 August, gilt
purchases were made in accordance with the quarterly
announcements on 1 April 2009 and 1 July 2009.
Developments in market structure
NYSE Liffe launches new options on short-term
interest rates
On 27 July, NYSE Liffe (a London-based derivatives exchange
within the NYSE Euronext group) launched new two-year
options on sterling and euro short-term interest rates.
As for existing options with shorter maturities, the new
options settle on futures contracts referencing three-month
market interest rates.  Sterling futures contracts settle on
three-month Libor and euro contracts settle on three-month
Euribor.  Option contracts therefore help investors hedge or
speculate on future levels of short-term interest rates.
The introduction of the new two-year options followed strong
growth in market activity for the existing shorter-maturity
options;  with average daily volume in both sterling and euro
contracts having increased more than 30% on the same period
of 2008.  In addition, there was a considerable increase in the
traded volume of futures contracts with two-year maturities,
which were up about 40% on the same period last year.
Increased activity in these contracts was said to reflect market
views that central banks would maintain interest rates at low
levels in the near term but more uncertainty about their levels
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Chart 44 Bank of England consolidated balance sheet:
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